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The	changing	British	policy	style:	from	governance	to
government
Jeremy	Richardson	explains	how	the	British	policy-making	style	has	been	steadily	shifting	away	from	governance
and	towards	government.	Here	he	examines	some	of	the	main	features	that	characterise	this	long	process,	and
concludes	that	Brexit	should	usher	in	a	return	to	governance.
There	are	two	broad	schools	describing	the	British	style	of	policy-making.	First,	what	for	decades	was	seen	as	the
typical	British	adversarial	and	hierarchical	policy	style,	the	so-called	‘Westminster	Model’,	reflecting	an	impositional
policy	style,	what	I	equate	with	government.	And	second,	a	contrasting	model	emphasising	a	more	collaborative	and
deliberative	policy	process,	especially	involving	interest	groups,	reflecting	a	consensual	policy	style,	what	I	term
governance.	Britain	has,	for	several	decades,	been	steadily	shifting	towards	government	and	away	from	governance.
Below,	I	examine	some	of	the	main	features	apparent	in	this	long	process.
The	austerity	and	reform	deficits	‘turns’
The	arrival	of	the	Thatcher	Government	in	1979	presaged	a	clear	shift	in	policy	style	from	governance	to
government.	There	is,	of	course,	a	danger	of	creating	a	myth	that	everything	changed	under	Mrs	Thatcher.	In	reality,
changing	things	was	not	always	so	easy.	For	example,	talking	expenditure	restraint	was	(and	remains)	relatively
easy;	delivering	it	not	so.	Indeed,	public	expenditure	was	somewhat	higher	in	1990	than	it	was	in	1979.	However,	the
fact	that	Mrs	Thatcher	and	all	governments	which	followed	did	not	achieve	all	that	they	set	out	to	do	in	terms	of	public
expenditure	restraint	does	not	show	that	the	policy	style	remained	unchanged.
The	emphasis	on	austerity	had	implications	for	the	UK	policy	style	as	a	whole.	For	example,	there	were	growing
demands	for	higher	public	expenditure	that	were	not	met,	thus	changing	the	relationship	between	government	and
groups.	In	practice	a	considerable	amount	of	policy	change	emanated	from	the	austerity	turn.	Policy	change	came
from	the	political	level,	top	down,	not	emerging	from	interest	groups	and	civil	servants,	bottom-up.
The	austerity	turn’s	importance	has	been	its	effect	on	actor	behaviour,	irrespective	of	its	actual	financial	outturn.
Other	post-war	governments	had	been	forced	to	apply	severe	budgetary	restraint	(notably	under	Harold	Wilson	and
the	IMF	crisis	in	1976)	but	this	was	force	majeure.	For	Mrs	Thatcher	and	subsequent	governments,	austerity	was	an
over-arching	belief	system,	from	which	nearly	all	action	flows.	This	belief	system	had	a	seismic	quality	about	it	and
had	the	capacity	to	cut	across	hitherto	autonomous	policy	sectors.	The	growing	power	of	the	Treasury	in	the
‘austerity	turn’	is	illustrated	by	the	experience	of	ministers	in	the	Coalition	Government.		For	example,	Nick	Harvey
(former	Minister	for	the	Armed	Forces)	was	particularly	acerbic	about	the	role	of	the	Treasury	(and,	indeed	Number
10	and	the	Cabinet	Office).	He	comments:
I	was	just	astonished	by	the	extent	to	which	Number	10	and	the	Treasury	and	the	Cabinet	Office	stuck
their	nose	into	departmental	affairs…	I	had	just	no	idea	the	extent	to	which	they	micro-managed	and
nosed	into	departmental	affairs.	I	was	absolutely	horrified	by	it	to	be	honest.
His	ministerial	reflections	capture	the	essence	of	the	post-1979	policy	game	in	which	attempted	budgetary
retrenchment	changed	the	rules	of	the	game	in	at	least	two	respects.	First,	the	primary	objective	of	policymaking
changed,	namely	expenditure	reduction	rather	than	policy	improvement.	Secondly,	there	appear	to	have	been
process	changes,	particularly	relating	to	how	the	Treasury	did	business	with	Departments.	The	old	policy	‘franchises’
came	under	long-term	expenditure	pressures	from	Thatcher,	through	the	Blair,	Brown,	and	Coalition	Governments,
with	added	force	under	the	Cameron	Conservative	administration.
However,	caution	is	needed	in	characterising	the	three	and	a	half	decades	post-Thatcher	as	solely	about	austerity.
An	equally	important	trend	has	been	underway,	namely	attacking	‘reform	deficits’.	The	Thatcher	Government	started
a	continuing	process	of	tackling	what	she	saw	as	many	reform	deficits	created	by	policy	community	politics,	or	the
‘governance’	policy	style.		The	long-term	trend	has	been	to	move	policymaking	from	the	private	management	of
public	business	back	into	a	more	public	sphere,	resulting	in	the	reduction	of	power	for	many	established	interests
such	many	of	the	professions,	trade	unions,	and	even	hitherto	powerful	business	interests
Ministerial/Civil	Service	relations	and	the	changing	policy	style
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There	have	also	been	important	changes	within	government	departments,	namely	a	change	in	the	balance	of	power
between	senior	civil	servants	on	the	one	hand,	and	Ministers	and	their	personal	partisan	staff	(Ministerial	advisers)
on	the	other.	The	trend	to	increase	the	amount	of	external	advice	has	produced	a	situation	where	many		ministers
(and	their	external	advisers,	both	official	and	informal)	arrive	in	office	with	a	more	ideational	policy	portfolio	in	that
they	have	their	own	strong	priorities	on	what	policy	change	is	needed.	There	has	been	a	shift	from	civil	servants
warning	ministers	and	keeping	them	out	of	trouble,	reflecting	the	traditional	risk	aversion	normally	attributed	to	the
British	civil	service,	towards	‘carriers’	of	ministerial	ideas,	willing	to	try	to	implement	policies	even	when	lacking	broad
policy	community	support.
The	changing	relationship	between	ministers	and	civil	servants	has	important	effects	on	policy	style	because	civil
servants	are	now	less	able	to	strike	a	consensus	with	interest	groups,	as	the	civil	servants	often	arrive	at	the	table	to
decisions	already	made,	rather	than	to	engage	in	a	process	of	mutual	learning	and	exchange	in	order	to	generate
policy	solutions.	The	zone	for	negotiation	is	often	much	smaller	than	hitherto,	and	this	fundamentally	changes	the
nature	of	the	interaction	between	civil	servants	and	groups,	and	hence	the	policy	style	itself.
However,	the	fact	that	the	more	hierarchical	or	impositional	policy	style	has	made	possible	a	lot	of	policy	change
does	not	mean	that	it	has	actually	increased	the	policy	system’s	capacity	to	solve	policy	problems	effectively.	There
are	big	risks	inherent	in	the	new	policy	style	under	which	consultation	is	much	more	constrained.
	Government	without	governance	is	a	difficult	and	risky	business
If	the	Westminster	model	is	now	rather	more	in	place,	radical	policy	change	should	be	easy	to	achieve.	A	clear	party
policy	line	and	a	parliamentary	majority	should	ensure	that	all	will	run	smoothly,	through	to	successful	policy
implementation,	textbook	style.	In	practice,	the	real	world	is	more	intractable.	Pressman	and	Wildavsky’s	classic	work
on	policy	implementation	had	as	its	subtitle,	‘How	high	hopes	in	Washington	were	dashed	in	Oakland	California’.
Their	central	message	was	that	there	was	more	policy	failure	than	success	in	the	US.	The	more	centralised	British
state	might	hope	to	fare	better	than	a	federal	system.
But	I	am	cautious	in	accepting	this	view,	not	least	because	the	pace	of	policy	change	in	Britain,	especially	that	driven
by	‘the	centre’	is	quite	frenetic.	For	example,	David	Halpern	(Head	of	Number	10’s	Behavioural	Insights	Team)
describes	life	behind	the	shiny	black	door	of	Number	10	as	akin	to	a	hospital	Accident	&	Emergency	Department.	He
comments	that	‘in	such	a	world,	there’s	often	not	the	time,	nor	the	patience,	for	the	answer	to	be	“more	research
needed”.	There	is	more	than	a	hint	here	of	a	‘pop-up’	style	of	policymaking	where	chaps	(mostly!)	with	seemingly
clever	policy	ideas	get	to	implement	them	without	the	need	to	consider	the	views	of,	or	seek	the	support	of,	the
affected	interests.
Indeed,	Crewe	and	King	argue	that	‘there	is	at	the	heart	of	the	British	system	a	lack	of	deliberation’.	Their	studies
show	that	a	lack	of	consultation,	or	ignoring	the	messages	resulting	from	consultation,	was	often	a	cause	of	policy
failure.	For	example,	they	see	the	massive	failure	of	Mrs	Thatcher’s	Poll	Tax	as	in	large	part	due	to	the	fact	that	the
Government	‘conferred	with	almost	no	one	outside	Whitehall	(and	ignored	the	views	of	two	outside	assessors	whom
they	did	consult)’.
Of	course,	excessive	group	power	can	lead	to	reform	deficits.		However,	effective	interest	group	involvement	in	both
problem	definition	and	policy	formulation	does	have	an	inherent	logic.	Groups	have	been	historically	integrated	into
public	policymaking	for	good	practical	reasons.	Their	participation	in	the	policy	process	contributes	essential
knowledge	which	policymakers	lack,	and	it	generally	raises	policy	effectiveness	providing	it	is	properly	managed	and
balanced.
My	worry	is	that	there	have	been	some	re-enforcing	trends	at	work	in	Britain	over	the	past	thirty	years	that	have
shifted	the	central	focus	of	the	policy	process	from	better	policies	towards	more	overtly	political	ones.	The	austerity
and	reform	turns;	the	strengthening	of	the	centre	in	relation	to	policy	departments;	the	increased	role	of	political
advisers	in	initiating	policy	change;	a	drift	towards	a	more	subservient	civil	service;	and	an	apparent	increasing
number	of	cases	where	interest	groups	are	marginalised,	can	have	a	cumulative	adverse	effect	on	the	quality	of
policy-making.	‘Strong	government’	has	a	nice	ring	to	it,	but	it	is	high	risk	too.
Postscript	on	Brexit
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Brexit	is	a	case	in	point	as	it	is	certainly	the	most	complex	policy	problem	facing	Britain	in	the	post-war	period.	At	the
core	of	the	policy	problem	is	the	urgent	need	to	negotiate	favourable	trade	deals	with	many	states.	Both	government
and	interest	groups	have	a	strong	incentive	to	get	things	right	in	trade	negotiations	and,	therefore,	to	collaborate	very
closely.	Moreover,	trade	negotiation	expertise	in	government	is	in	short	supply	and	so	at	least	some	groups	can
expect	high	levels	of	integration	in	policymaking.
In	contrast,	many	groups,	such	as	environmental	and	women’s	groups	will	find	it	difficult	to	exert	influence	under	a
hard	Brexit	where	the	UK	moves	to	a	de-regulated	economy.	More	generally,	Brexit	will	certainly	repatriate
government/interest	group	relations	from	Brussels.	The	reduction	in	group	influence	at	the	national	level	has	often
been	more	than	compensated	by	a	shift	in	the	locus	of	policymaking	from	London	to	the	Brussels	‘policy-making
state‘	as	UK	groups	across	virtually	all	policy	sectors	have	exploited	an	alternative	venue.	In	that	sense,	the	trends
that	I	have	described	have	been	moderated	for	interest	groups.	Sans	Bruxelles,	one	can	expect	groups	to	become
more	active	at	the	national	level.
Moreover,	it	would	be	foolish	for	government	to	marginalise	groups	and	to	pursue	a	top-down	style	of	policy-making
when	faced	with	the	truly	huge	task	of	deciding	what	to	do	about	the	massive	amount	of	EU	legislation	that	will
remain	in	place	on	day	one	of	Brexit,	albeit	as	British	law.	Interest	groups,	above	all,	know	best	which	EU	laws	are
working	well,	which	are	not,	and	which	are	no	longer	needed.	Thus,	Brexit	should	usher	in	a	return	to	governance.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	British	Politics.
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